The Not So Curious Case of Benjamin… Cardozo
An essential element in a personal injury case is to prove proximate or legal cause. The burden is on the plaintiff, the person suing, to show that the negligence alleged is a proximate or legal cause of the injury sustained. Causation is broken into two parts: “but for” cause and proximate cause. Certain acts are “but for” causes of what happened but that, by itself, is insufficient to establish liability. There must also be proximate cause. The definition of proximate cause can be exceedingly complicated and such law, when read to a jury, is a lot to grasp. Indeed, teaching a proximate cause can comprise a month or more of a first year’s torts class. Those lessons are necessarily condensed when a judge must instruct a jury on the law. To the extent proximate cause can be defined in one sentence, it has been said to be “the active efficient cause that sets in motion a train of events which brings about a result without the intervention of any force started and working actively from a new and independent source…” Lynn Gas & Electric Co. v. Meriden Ins. Co. 158 Mass. 570, 575 (1893). I think you can see why proximate cause is complicated. Fortunately, some descriptions are easier to digest. “Legal cause” is often used instead of “direct and proximate cause”. It has been defined as asking whether the defendant’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm. See discussion in Massachusetts Practice, Tort Law, Volume 37, Section 226.
The most cited case on proximate cause is Palsgraf v. Long Island Rail Road Co., a 1928 decision of the highest court of New York state. Palsgraf was written by Benjamin Cardozo, a legal giant who shortly thereafter was made a United States Supreme Court Justice. The facts involved alleged negligence against two railroad employees. One employee helped a man carrying a package board a moving train while another employee pushed the man from behind. In so doing, the man’s package dropped and its contents exploded injuring a woman nearby. Justice Cardozo wrote, “the conduct of the defendant’s guard…was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff…Nothing in this situation gave notice that the falling package had in it the potency of peril…” Careful readers will not that this explanation raises issues of duty to the plaintiff and the foreseeability of the harm. Despite almost thirty years of representing plaintiffs, I think the Palsgraf result is an appropriate one. It may limit proximate cause but within the definition there is ample room for aggrieved individuals to recover from tortious acts.
